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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
A REPLY TO VAIDYA
MICHAEL KRAUSZ
I am grateful to Anand Vaidya for his thoughtful and enthusiastic review. In the spirit
of constructive engagement, I reply to Vaidya's comments on my book, Dialogues on
Relativism, Absolutism, and Beyond: Four Days in India (“RAB” for short). Vaidya's
review continues the dialogical spirit of RAB by introducing a fifth fictional
interlocutor, Manjula, to comment upon RAB's four fictional interlocutors. When I
started to think about my own comments I was tempted to introduce a sixth, even a
seventh interlocutor. But I concluded that would be unwieldy. So I have decided to
come out from behind RAB’s four characters and comment in my own voice on
Manjula's comments about them. Given space limitations I will comment on some
selected points, arranged in an order different from Vaidya’s.
Since the publication of RAB, its sequel has appeared. Its title is Oneness and the
Displacement of Self: Dialogues on Self-Realization (“ODS” for short). The four
interlocutors in RAB continue their conversations in ODS. While the main themes of
RAB concern relativism versus absolutism, ODS concentrates on Nina’s Advaita
view which is “beyond” relativism and absolutism. Readers of RAB may wish to
consult ODS for a ramified discussion of Nina's views. Here then are my comments
about Manjula's interventions.
Defining Relativism. I begin with Ronnie's definition of relativism. “Relativism
claims that truth, goodness, or beauty is relative to a reference frame, and no absolute,
overarching standards to adjudicate between competing references frames exist.”
(RAB, 10) Ronnie's definition allows that relativism may range over “truth, goodness
or beauty”--not “truth, goodness and beauty.” One reason for the “or” rather than the
“and” is that it allows for either piecemeal or global treatments of relativism. Manjula
capitalizes on the possibility of treating relativism in different ways in different
domains.
In reference to RAB, 34, Manjula says that, “...relativism is initially attractive in
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certain areas of discourse, or what we might call domains.” Following a piecemeal
strategy, she distributes relativism according to domains. That strategy accords with
Ronnie's definition of relativism. Yet there is an impediment in doing so. How should
we characterize the pertinent domains and the joints that are supposed to separate
them? Are their descriptions supposed to capture a frame-independent fact of the
matter? Or are their descriptions meant to capture constructed cultural achievements?
The construal of pertinent domains and their joints implicates relativist or absolutist
predilections. Question-begging looms.
Similarly, in regard to RAB, 52, Manjula observes, “it is easier to be a relativist
in the case of morality and aesthetics than it is in the case of logic and mathematics.”
Quite so. Yet, such ease gets burdened when interlocutors raise questions about the
nature of the domains in question. Indeed moral realists will object to characterizing
morality in relativist terms. And mathematical, logical or scientific constructivists
will object to characterizing mathematics, logic, or science in absolutist terms. (See
Catherine Elgin, in Krausz, 2010a). The domains in question are themselves variously
construed as regard their relativist or absolutist standing.
Ronnie’s definition of relativism captures a wide range of established usages.
Alternative definitions may emphasize a supposed incommensurability between
reference frames (See Richard Bernstein 1983, 8). Other definitions may emphasize
multivalent rather than bi-valent truth-like values. (See Joseph Margolis 1976)
Manjula provides an ample and useful discussion of multivalence. In regard to RAB,
44-45, one might wonder why Barbara raises the issue of multivalence in the first
place. The reason is that bivalence is central to a version of relativism that diverges
from, but is nonetheless compatible with, Ronnie's starting definition. Barbara does
so as a point of contrast with Ronnie’s definition. Focusing upon cultural phenomena,
Margolis notes that interpreters of cultural phenomena characteristically invoke
multivalent values—such as reasonableness, appropriateness, aptness, fittingness and
their opposites—in contrast to the bivalent value of truth and its opposite.
Accordingly, Margolis urges that opposing judgments that would be contradictory on
a bivalent logic turn out not to be so on a multivalent logic. Opposing judgments on a
multivalent logic would be incongruent rather than contradictory. To say that a
Marxist interpretation of Vincent Van Gogh's “Potato Eaters” is reasonable, for
example, is not to say that a Christian interpretation of the same painting is
unreasonable.
Self-Refutation of Relativism. In regard to RAB, 63-64, Ronnie rehearses the wellworn self-referential argument against relativism, namely “The assertion that
relativism is absolutely true is self-contradictory.” Notice that Ronnie partly defines
relativism in terms of the negation of absolutism. If we disentangle absolutism into
three strands—namely realism, universalism or foundationalism—does the selfrefuting argument against relativism still apply? On RAB, 65, Nina affirms that the
charge of self-contradiction dissolves when absolutism is disentangled in this way.
On RAB, 80, as Nina distinguishes between the three strands, she shows that their
various combinations amount to harder or softer versions of absolutism.
Consequently their relativist opposites amount to harder or softer relativisms.
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Manjula seems to agree with all of this. Yet she goes further. She inquires whether
the disentangled strands are compatible with each other. Of course, the hardest
version of absolutism combines realism, universalism, and foundationalism. It may be
instantiated by a moral realist, for example, who holds that moral facts exist
independently of reference frames, that they apply to all human beings, and that they
reflect values that reveal inherent features of what it is to be a human being. The
plausibility of such a hard version of absolutism is another matter, beyond the scope
of RAB.
Meta-Principles. In regard to RAB, 63, Manjula raises the question, “Is it possible
for one to be a relativist about truth...and to limit the scope of application of the
principles in question?” Can one say that the claim of relativism is a meta-principle
that is outside the scope to which it applies? The point of doing so would allow one to
say that, “All statements are relatively true except for the statement that says that all
statements are relatively true.” This strategy seems arbitrary or ad hoc, invoked
merely to avoid the self-referential argument. The reason why it seems to be so arises
from an often assumed, perhaps unmentioned, meta-meta-principle, namely, “It is
best to keep ‘meta’ principles consonant with object-level principles, unless there are
good non-arbitrary reasons to make a particular object-principle an exception.” Such
good reasons would need to overcome the fact that meta-principles might be infinitely
generated. That is, a given meta-principle may become an object-principle with
regard to a higher order meta-principle. Such a process can be generated infinitely. At
some point, though, in order to save one from the charge of self-contradiction, one
will have to stipulate that a given meta-principle is not relative. Where that point does
come promises to be arbitrary. (See Paul Boghossian, in Krausz 2010a.)
Foundationalism. Manjula observes that Nina is right to say (RAB, 76) that “The
foundationalist says that there is an ultimate [or foundational] constituent. The nonfoundationalist says that there is no such thing as an ultimate constituent.” Manjula
suggests a third possibility, namely, “that there are ultimate and there are no ultimate
constituents.” But does her third possibility reduce to one of the first two? Here is the
analogy Manjula adduces to make her point. “The analogy would be the example of
light, which has a fundamental dual nature particle and wave. It is both a particle and
wave, and given that particles are not waves, it is like saying that something is both F
and not-F. This dual nature is fundamental to it. Likewise, we could say that reality
has a fundamental dual nature: to have an ultimate constituent and to not have a
fundamental constituent.” I presume that Manjula takes “ultimate” or “fundamental”
to be synonymous with “foundational.” Now, it is one thing to say that light has the
dual nature of both particles and waves, and another thing to say that that duality is
foundational. Either that dual nature is taken to be foundational or it is not. Indeed,
some physicists hold out the possibility that the apparent incompatibility between
particle and wave will be overcome by the eventual discovery of a unifying waveparticle or “wavicle.” Yet whether the discovery of a wavicle is foundational is a
separate and an open question. Affirming the dual or singular nature of light in itself
commits us neither to foundationalism nor non-foundationalism.
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A “Third” Attempt at Reconciliation. In reference to RAB, 36, Barbara seeks to
reconcile relativism with absolutism. She attempts to do so by combining the term
“relativism” with “absolutism” in order to generate “absolute relativism” or “relative
absolutism.” Then she asks herself what ramified self-consistent view each of these
compound phrases might generate.
Manjula proposes what she thinks is a further view that might reconcile relativism
with absolutism. She calls it perspectivism. But is perspectivism a third view, one that
is reducible to neither “absolute relativism” nor “relative absolutism?” Manjula asks,
“Why can’t it be that relativism is one perspective on the way things are, and
absolutism is another perspective on the way things are?” (RAB, 36) That question
invites us to consider relativism as one reference frame and absolutism as another
reference frame. It effectively invites us to relativize absolutism. But relativizing
absolutism results in “absolute relativism,” one of the possibilities that the
interlocutors have already considered.
Reasons. Barbara says (RAB, 88): “Without aiming to convince another person to
embrace their view, relativists might seek to share their rationale for embracing their
view.” In so doing relativists might offer what I have elsewhere called ampliative
reasons in contrast to determinative reasons. (See Krausz 2007, 36-37) Ampliative
reasons seek to promote an understanding as to why persons embrace the view that
they do. Determinative reasons aim to demonstrate the superiority of one view over
another. As such they aim to convince an opponent of the rightness of their view. In
contrast, Manjula offers a different distinction. She says: “We have to distinguish
between hardened debate and positioned-inquiry.” Hardened debaters “are not open
minded...[while] in positioned-inquiry each participant has a point of view, but is
open-minded.” To tell the difference we should ask, “Are they open-minded, curious,
creative, courageous, and patient in their examination of the evidence and in their
intellectual engagement? Or are they close-minded, blunt, cowardly, and negligent in
their examination of the evidence and in their intellectual engagement?” The
distinction between ampliative reasons and determinative reasons is not coextensive
with the distinction between positioned-inquiry and hardened debate. When offering
ampliative reasons one can be an open-minded fallibilist or a closed-minded
dogmatist. And when offering determinative reasons one can also be an open-minded
fallibilist or a closed-minded dogmatist. Accordingly, debaters about relativism
versus absolutism can offer their reasons in either an ampliative or a determinative or
way. Neither way makes them fallibilists or dogmatists.
Fallibilism. In regard to RAB, 12, Manjula expresses doubts about global
fallibilism. She concedes that while one might be fallibilist with respect to some
domains—say, beliefs about the future or the external world—one should not be
fallibilist about self-verifying claims. She suggests that “I am here now” is immune
from doubt. Of course, “I am here now” can be left unquestioned. But in principle it
too is fallible. If we take seriously the Advaita view as embraced by Nina, for
example, we can legitimately ask, “Is it I that is here?” “Where is here?” and “When
is now?” Depending upon one’s answer to such questions, one could be wrong to say,
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“I am here now.” The exemption of such self-verifying claims from global fallibilism
is contentious.
Frames of Reference and Facts of the Matter. In response to Adam's sort of
realism Manjula says (RAB, 22): “To talk of a reference frame or a plurality of
reference frames is to talk of a frame of reference relative to something that is not a
frame of reference. You might as well call these matters of fact.” Manjula is too
casual when she says, “You might as well call these matters of fact.” For “facts of the
matter”—as all the interlocutors use that phrase—designates frame-independence. So
we should not force upon Ronnie “facts” in a realist sense. For Ronnie, facts exist, but
they do so, ineliminably, within reference frames. (See Nelson Goodman, in Krausz
2010a.) Manjula does get the point right though when she says further, “Frames of
reference are frames onto something. But on the other hand, this just seems to be an
artifact of the way the language we use forces us into thinking there is something
there. Why can’t it just be frames upon frames upon frames all the way down?”
Manjula comes to see that it is a mistake just to assume that there must be some
frame-independent thing that reference frames are of, that is, some stuff out there that
they reflect. Here Manjula agrees with Ronnie.
In regard to RAB, 39, Manjula repeats Barbara’s insight: “There’s no fact of the
matter whether the shortest distance between two points is a straight line independent
of a given geometry. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line in
Euclidean geometry and it isn’t so in a non-Euclidean geometry.” Manjula continues,
“However, once I tell you that in fact we live in a curved space, there is a fact of the
matter about what is the shortest distance between two points.” Once we distinguish
between facts that are internal to reference frames and those that are external to
reference frames, there is no disagreement. Both of these women agree that internal to
Euclidean geometry it is a fact that the shortest distance between two points is a
straight line, and it is not a fact in a Riemannian geometry. Yet Manjula presses the
point that both of these geometries are still "about" something in common, namely
space. As Manjula puts it, “there must be something in common between all
geometric systems, for example that they are systems used to describe space. Can’t
we say that the thing in common is in fact the real absolute across all of these
things?” Here Manjula commits the mistake she just warned us against. Commonality
of what reference frames might be about does not entail a realist construal of what is
common. Accordingly, getting things “right” need not be construed in realist terms.
Frames of Reference as Negative Filters. In regard to RAB, 47, Manjula says, “It
seems like we always think that because something may not capture everything, that
it distorts or falsifies or doesn’t allow us to get at things in some important way. But
this comes about by imposing a negative meta-frame on the words lens, language,
and filter.” By “getting at things” Manjula presumably means, “getting closer to the
truth.” Yet again question beggingness looms. Relativist Ronnie can concede that
lenses and the rest can help us get closer to the truth. But he need not unpack “getting
closer to the truth” in a realist way. One who embraces a coherentist rather than a
correspondist theory of truth can agree that lenses, language and filters can advance
certain purposes and interests, but still disallow that we “get at things.” To put the
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point in pragmatist terms, Barbara, for example, might urge that what is good for us
to believe need not pretend to reflect the way a presumed world is. Lenses and the
rest need not be taken to distort if nothing can be said about what is beyond them. The
idea of “distortion” does not require a realist construal.
Sameness. Nina observes (RAB, 18) that, for reference frames to compete—rather
than talk past each other—they would have to be talking about the same thing.
Strangely, Manjula objects. She suggests, “it might just be false that a necessary
condition on two frames competing is that they are talking about the same thing.” Yet
sameness is a necessary condition. What is at issue is not whether sameness is a
necessary condition for competition between reference frames. Rather, what is at
issue is the sense of sameness that is necessary. Manjula herself confirms this point
when she suggests that it is enough if competing reference frames address roughly the
same thing. Indeed, both Adam and Ronnie can agree that competing reference
frames need address roughly the same thing.
Knowledge of the World and Polymorphism. In regard to RAB, 40, Manjula
questions whether the result of frame-dependent interpretations can constitute
“knowledge.” Unless we place a realist construal on “knowledge,” no knowledge of
“the world” would be possible. Ronnie could reply that, for the idea of “world,” we
had best substitute the idea of “world-version.” He could go on to affirm a view that I
have called “polymorphism.” (See Krausz 2010b, 25.) Polymorphism holds that no
given level of description can be presumed to be ultimate or foundational. For
example, if we describe the water in the glass before us as thirst quenching, we might
take that description to reflect a truth about “the world.” Yet notice that thirst
quenchingness is a property of water that applies at a certain level of description. As a
middle-sized phenomenon, water affords certain satisfactions to middles sized
organisms. Yet when we redescribe what is before us in terms of electrons in empty
space, the property of thirst-quenchingness does not apply. Polymorphism holds that
what is taken to be a property of “the world” must be understood elliptically, that is,
with an understanding of a certain level of description, or within a reference frame.
Now apply the same polymorphic insight to Manjula's example. Manjula may
truthfully know that she is hungry. Yet that knowledge depends upon her
understanding herself as a middle-sized organism rather than as a collection of
electrons in empty space. Were Manjula to understand herself as a collection of
electron in empty space, the claim about her hunger would be inapplicable.
Interestingly, this polymorphic view is shared with Tibetan Buddhists who hold that
nothing exists inherently. That does not mean that nothing exists. It means that
whatever does exist does so conventionally. One consequence of this Buddhist view
is that the human self in empty of inherent existence.
Oneness and Adjudication. In contrast to the Tibetan Buddhist, Nina embraces
the Advaita notion that ultimate reality is the inherent, undifferentiated, ineffable
Atman or the One. She observes (RAB, 25) that the One could do no adjudicatory
work, including adjudicating between reference frames. Even if we had access to it—
perhaps via certain meditative practices—it could still do no adjudicatory work. After
all, how could the One distinguish and adjudicate between metaphysical reference

Comparative Philosophy 5.1 (2014)

KRAUSZ

26

frames when it is undifferentiated and ineffable? The One is beyond adjudication.
This would be so despite the fact that the One is “understood” at the so-called
“absolute” level of existence. Of course, what “absolute” means for Nina is quite
different from what it does for Adam and Ronnie, namely frame-independence. Nina
takes the absolute One to transcend both absolutism and relativism. Adam's
absolutism pertains to individuated phenomena, and the One is not that. The One is
no absolute adjudicator. So, with Nina, one could embrace the One and still allow
relativism as Ronnie defines it.
Anxiety About Death. In regard to RAB, 91, Nina says, “We all seek freedom
from suffering of old age and death. We all seek freedom from the anxieties
associated with our mortality.” Manjula objects to Nina’s universalist presumption
that all persons suffer death anxiety and seek freedom from it. It would be wrong for
Nina to assert, even to legislate, such a universality. The claim that all human beings
suffer from death anxiety is too strong. Yet, it would be fair to say that human beings
characteristically suffer a measure of anxiety associated with their mortality. The
question how widespread that anxiety is is empirical. On this point I defer to the
empirical work of psychotherapist Irvin Yalom in his perceptive book, Staring at the
Sun. (See Irvin Yalom 2009.)
Limits of Language. In regard to RAB, 116, Barbara rehearses Nina’s view that
“the debate between Adam and Ronnie dissolves because language can’t capture the
way things are. You [Nina] think that language is inherently limited because of its
essentially dualistic nature. So, since both Adam's and Ronnie’s arguments–inevitably
in a language–seek to capture how things are, they both must fail to do so.” In turn,
Manjula questions whether all languages, including formal languages, have to be
dualistic. I agree with Manjula that the possibility of non-dualistic languages—natural
or artificial—remains open. In addition, for purposes of human expression there
seems no reason why language, natural or artificial, should not suffice. Yet Nina
could well have added that any duality, not just those in languages, can be drawn only
at the relative level. She would insist that language could not capture the One, which
is without limits. Yet saying that, even if dualistic language is incapable of capturing
the ultimate way reality is, seems to presuppose that in some way we know how
reality is in order to affirm that language is incapable of capturing it. (See Bimal
Matilal 2001)
A Category Mistake and the Displacement of Self. In regard to RAB, 97, Nina
considers the question, “What is the relation of Oneness–the realm of no relations–to
the realm of differentiated, countable individuals [including individual reference
frames] and their relations?” She rejects the question since it does not recognize that
the One could have no relations to start with. Nina says: “In the realm of no relations,
there’s no question of the relation between it and the realm of relations. Your
[Barbara's] very question disallows the realm of no relations.” Manjula also rejects
the question, but her reason for doing so differs from Nina’s. Manjula suggests that it
commits a “category mistake” rather like the question, “Does 2 have parents in
Mumbai?” I agree with Manjula that such a question, while grammatically correct,
commits a category mistake. Keeping in mind the mantric refrain, “Thou Art That,”
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“Thou”—understood as an individuated person—is just not the sort of being that
could qualify as being “That”--understood as the absolute One that Nina seeks to
realize. But something deeper than a category mistake is going on here. It concerns
Nina's project of self-realization. That project is encapsulated in the mantric refrain
that Nina adopts. Its ritual repetition is meant to aid in altering one's consciousness.
As “relative” individuals we may ask, “What is the relation between me, my
individual personal self, and the One?” Yet, insofar as the One admits of no
individuality, the question no longer arises. Ritual repetition of the mantric refrain is
meant to displace the personal speaker as the subject, then to be replaced by the
impersonal space of the One.	
   (See	
   Krausz	
   2013,	
   section	
   6.)	
   Whatever	
   else	
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   grammatical	
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   not	
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   easily	
  
dismiss	
  it.	
  
I look forward to further exchanges with Anand Vaidya about relativism,
absolutism and beyond. For me, this engagement has been most constructive.
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